In a November 6 blog post, Euthanasia Prevention Coalition executive director Alex Schadenberg claims that prosecuting a practitioner who provides MAiD to someone whose sole underlying medical condition is a mental illness would be “impossible.” His reasoning is that the practitioner need only be “of the opinion” that the person meets the eligibility criteria. Schadenberg continues to be confused about what “be of the opinion” means in law and medicine.
That is not what the law says. A practitioner’s opinion does not override the Criminal Code.
Under section 241.2(2.1), mental illness is excluded as a qualifying medical condition. A person whose sole underlying medical condition is a mental illness is therefore ineligible. A practitioner who knowingly provides MAiD on that basis would be acting outside the law. Believing that the person should be eligible does not make them eligible.
Schadenberg’s claim also ignores an important distinction in section 227(3). That provision protects a practitioner who has a “reasonable but mistaken belief” about a fact relevant to the legal exemption. It does not provide blanket protection for whatever a practitioner happens to think.
If a practitioner knows that mental illness is the person’s sole underlying medical condition, but proceeds because they personally believe MAiD should be available in those circumstances, that is not a reasonable mistake about a medical fact. It is a decision to disregard the legal exclusion. Section 227(3) does not turn that decision into lawful care.
There could be cases involving a genuine factual dispute—for example, whether another qualifying medical condition was present. Whether a mistaken belief was reasonable would depend on the evidence. But simply asserting “I thought they were eligible” does not establish immunity from prosecution.
The requirement to form a professional medical opinion is one part of the assessment process. It does not replace the eligibility criteria or give practitioners permission to ignore them.
We can debate whether oversight is sufficient. Claiming that prosecution is impossible because a practitioner’s opinion overrides the law misrepresents the law itself.